UN Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire
UN Peacekeeping Operation Final Report, written for Political Science 106PK: UN Peacekeeping taught by Professor William G. Nomikos. One of my favourite classes I’ve had in these first two years, Peacekeeping (the class) covered everything from the idealistic beginnings with the UN Charter and Ralph Bunche, through the trials and failures along the way to building the peacekeeping machine, and delving deep into dark realities of the sexual exploitation linked to UN PKOs. Never, it must be said, did the class take a destructive eye towards the UN. At times deconstructive but always maintained the importance of reform in the system.
§1 Introduction
“United Nations Operation Côte d’Ivoire,” (UNOCI) was deployed to the West African nation of Côte d'Ivoire from 2004 to 2017. It was deployed in response to a ethnically changed civil war and was witness to the breakout of a second civil war in 2010 following a contriversial election. This mission and conflict are important as a case study for peacekeeping sucess–understanding allows us to replicate the results elsewhere–and as one of the most prosperous nations in West Africa, it is vital that Côte d'Ivoire remain stable or else there be negative consequences for the rest of the region due to the displacement of people and reduction in economic productivity.
This paper is divided in five sections, §2 will review background information on Côte d'Ivoire and offer a general profile of the country. This background will also give the basis for the conflict discussed in §3. §4 will delve into UNCOIC and disucss it the sucesses such as ending large-scale violence, as well as discuss the failures of the UN to prevent and adequately respond to incidents of sexual abuse by peacekeepers. In §5 I will outline three reccomendations for future UN involvement in Côte d'Ivoire: (1) to make gender a focus of future mandates to prevent abuse (2) institute a small Chapter VII mission to oversee the upcoming elections, and (3) rely on Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for on the ground support.
§2 Background
Côte d'Ivoire is the largest economy in West Africa, driven by agricultural exports and has a history of French colonialism. It borders Liberia to the west and Ghana to the east and has an extensive south-facing coastline. About 65% of Côte d'Ivoire is agricultural land that produces. Côte d'Ivoire has historically exported raw cocoa, oils, and coffee, but has begun investing in the production of processed cashews and cocoa.
Côte d'Ivoire became a French Colony in 1893 and would remain under their rule until 1960 when peaceful independence was achieved. The majority of French efforts took place in the South, which left the southerners with the most power. Félix Houphouët-Boigny was the first Ivorian president and under a one party presidential model remained in power until his death in 1993.
There is both a religious and ethnic divide in Côte d'Ivoire. The north is majority Muslim (42%) and made up of the Northern Mande (22%) and Voltaic (22%) groups. The south is 33% Christian and ethniclly 38% Akan and 8.6% Southern Mande. This division was a driving factor in the First Ivorian Civil War in 2002. Before this civil war, Côte d'Ivoire was quite peaceful, it did not need a violent movement to win independence and, under Boigny, stabilized and developed significantly. However, as is often the case after the death of personalist authoritarian leaders, countries are likely to experience conflict.
§3 Conflict
The First Ivorian Civil War began due to increasing tensions between the North and South, exacerbated by exclusionary policies and rising immigration. Boigny’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié, another southern elite, institutionalized the present ethnic divisions under the policy of Ivorité. The project was to build an Ivorian national identity, this was done by prioritizing Christianity, Ivorian ancestry, and the Akan ethnic group. Ivorité radically shifted the state’s citizenship requirements, leading to disenfranchisement and the blocking of candidate Alassane Ouattara from participating in the 2000 election. Northerners were often accused of being “false Ivorians” and foreign immigrants. All these actions increased grievance in the North.
After 2000, and the controversial election tensions reached a tipping point. In 2001, supporters of Ouattara from the north attempted a coup on the recently elected Laurent Gbagbo. This attempt was unsuccessful but marked the second coup in as many years as back in 1999 there was a mutiny that saw General Robert Guei take over the presidency briefly. On September 19th, 2002 rebel groups which would become the Forces Nouvelles attacked the commercial capital of Côte d’Ivoire of Abidjan and other northern towns. Their stated aims were to remove the “illegitimate” President Gbagbo and bring an end to the exclusion and discrimination of northern Ivorians. Despite the attack, the government forces of President Gbagbo would hold the city. The government forces were supported by the United States and the French–who had troops stationed in Côte d’Ivoire and assisted directly in the warfighting.
The country quickly became divided into the rebel-held north and government-controlled south. A ceasefire deal was signed in May 2003, but the country remained divided, and sporadic violence continued. Eventually, with UN support, the country was reunified in 2007, although this peace was to be short-lived. In the first election post-conflict in November 2010, Outtara rose as the internationally recognized winner but under false accusations of fraud, President Gbagbo would not concede–even swearing himself in as president. This would begin the Second Ivorian Civil War, which lasted five months and ended with the pro-Ouattara forces' capture of the capital. This effort was crucially supported by French troops, who, though they supported the government in the first war, aligned themselves with the rebels.
Today, we may be facing another turbulent election cycle that could renew violence. The French troops which in both wars were crucial in obtaining peace, have been expelled, and President Ouattara may attempt to run an unconstitutional fourth term. Additionally, with the UN Peacekeeping operation’s close in 2017 the upcoming elections this year may be the greatest test of Ivorian democracy yet as the country looks to stabilize itself without international guardrails.
§4 Peacebuilding Operation
The primary operation of note in Côte d’Ivoire was UNOCI, though there was one preceding operation. Coming immediately before UNOCI was that of a smaller operation the “United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire” or MINUCI. Established in 2003, this mission (while Chapter VII) was extremely limited in scope, the sole focus was aiding in the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. This agreement laid political reforms that would end the current practice of discrimination and limit the president’s power. In total less than 200 observers and no combat peacekeepers. It soon became clear that to fulfill the UN’s objective to preserve and create peace, much more would need to be invested.
§4.1 Background
The United Nations authorized the establishment of UNOCI on February 27th, 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1528. Resolution 1528 lays out the mission as (1) monitor the ceasefire and movement of armed groups, (2) to begin the practice of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), (3) and to bring law and order to Côte d’Ivoire. The evaluation of each objective will take place in §4.2 and §4.3.
The expanded scope of the mission demanded a significant step up in the peacekeeping force–which was to be further aided by the deployed French and ECOWAS peacekeepers. To fulfill these aims the Security Council authorized a maximum military strength of 6,260 peacekeepers which was upped to 7200 military troops and 1250 police personnel in advance of the 2010 elections. Resolution 1528 lays out the directive for the UN to share information for the French to support the UN effort and authorizes French action to, “use all necessary force to support UNOCI (. . .) [to intervene] against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI.” The expanded mandate allowed UNOCI peacekeepers and their French partners to engage coercively in the conflict–both deterring further aggression and punishing action taken outside the peace agreement.
§4.2 Successes
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration were major successes of UNOCI. The goal, as the name implies, is to first de-arm combatants through the collection of weapons, then to demobilize factions by splitting fighters up by shutting down encampments or barracks, and lastly, create opportunities for employment and support ex-combatants. The UN assesses and creates reports of groups and sizes to estimate how many fighters need to be de-armed; the success of DDR may then, in part, be measured by the percentage of this population which the UN collects weapons from.
DDR was most sucessful after the second civil war. In the period of 2012-2015 (you will recall the second war ended in 2010), UN peacekeepers disarmed 92% of the 74,000-person target. Further, 89% were reintegrated with UN support through financial assistance (covering combatants' bills while they look for work) or vocational training readying them for civilian work. While this was a success, there remains potential for violence as weapons often remain in civilian hands, which are more challenging to track and disarm. Additionally, critics may argue true success would have been disarming directly after the First Civil War–potentially avoiding a second break in violence entirely, however, this bar for success is too restrictive, as it cannot be expected that once the UN deploys, everything is resolved. What counts is preparation and response.
To expand on this, we can look at the other two primary goals of UNOCI: monitoring the ceasefire and reinstating law and order. Could it be said that the UN failed due to the outbreak of the second war on it’s watch? I answer no, so long as peace is restored and the UN takes steps to actively reduce the damage, we may claim the UN has succeeded. In UN Resolution 1933, passed by the Security Council in advance of the 2010 elections, the Security Council urges voter lists to be made public, emphasizes the reduction in ethnically charged rhetoric, and reiterates its authorization for peacekeepers to use “all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate. The UN took the threat of violence seriously and came prepared to restore peace, it was not caught by surprise and was, within a matter of months able to ensure the rightful winner was installed as president. In fact it went so far it lost impariality. But, considering the stakes of civil war, if the UN is to bring peace, it cannot sit idly by when the matter is black and white.
§4.3 Failures
While the UNOCI did well to fulfill its mandate in broad strokes, it undermines its success in state reform when its own actions harm citizens. From 2007-2011 there were 42 reported incidents of sexual abuse made against UNOCI. Such incidents include engaging in transactional sex with underage girls often trading food or housing for sex. Such actions actively undermine the success and legitimacy of the UN’s mission as the local population is abused and becomes dependent on the sex trade to live. Some parents of these children were encouraged to seek out sex with peacekeepers with eight of ten randomly selected girls reporting they regularly engaged in transactional sex with UN personnel. The dependence these girls have on sex for money does not disappear when the UN departs, such action by UN personnel harms the future success of the communities to which they are deployed to help. The United Nations cannot permit this action to continue and take seriously the devastating effects of incidents like these.
§5 Recommendations
Building off the key successes and failures discussed throughout §4 allows three recommendations to be made regarding the future of Côte d’Ivoire and future PKOs at large.
§5.1 An Emphasis on Women
In response to the serious allegations and findings, the UN claimed that “If these allegations are founded, it would be the responsibility of the countries from which these peacekeepers come to take appropriate action against those involved,” and while this is strictly speaking true, it should not remain the attitude of the UN and the organization ought to invest in the lives of women and girls in those countries which have experienced sexual exploitation at the hands of peacekeepers. The UN is obliged to put resources towards the education and reproductive health of women in countries where peacekeepers have scarred the community through engaging in sexual exploitation and transactional sex. It is necessary for the long-term stability and growth of a stable democracy that gender equality is achieved, as such, gender must be a primary focus of UN operations.
Further, as it pertains to future peacekeeping missions, such as that which will be proposed in the following sections, the United Nations must practice not just gender balacing (by including more women in PKOs) but begin to deconstruct the gendered hieracrchies within the institution and milities at large. This latter task is no easy feat but is necessary to stop eliminate the hypermasculinized/militerized attitude which results in peacekeepers commiting sexual abuse. Equal oppertunity peacekeeping must become the norm, with reforms in training and seeking out peacekeepers from countries with better gender track records. So, recruiting more peacekeepers from countries from countries with higher rates of gender equality and women in the workforce while also implementing reform to training across the board to limit and walk back the attitudes which privilege masculinity over femininity. Further, the UN must institute far greater penalties on peacekeepers and countries who routinely violoate the UN’s no tolerance policy. As it stands currently no one is punished, soliders are only removed from the mission–a punishment miniscule compared to the crime. The UN must demand more from peacekeepers and hold offenders accountable.
§5.2 Future Stability is in Question and May Demand Further Operations
While the current situation does not warrant the redeployment of thousands of troops the UN may yet have a role to play in the peace of Côte d’Ivoire. Any day now President Alassane Ouattara may declare his candidacy for a fourth term which would bring forth a constitutional crisis–and potentially renewed conflict. Through a small Chapter VII peacekeeping operation, the UN may support the elections process with buy-in from both Northern and Southern Ivorians. This operation would not necessarily need to involve many warfighting peacekeepers. Instead it would primarily be staff and officials that could oversee the election process. Chapter VII is most appropriate as the action is strictly peaking not peacekeeping (i.e. the monitoring of a ceasefire) but rather more progressive peacebuilding, which looks to actively engage in state-building and supporting the government. By combining aid with peacebuilding projects the UN can increase the international and local capacities of Côte d’Ivoire, enhancing both these capabilities will result in sustained peace. In futute mandates should make explicit plans for state building as well as offering the UN broad range of action should it be needed.
§5.3 ECOWAS to fulfill the Peacekeeping role
The final recommendation is for the UN to embolden ECOWAS into providing a deterrent force of peacekeepers. The UN has a unique ability to deploy troops who are seen as unbiased due to both the structure of the organization and the number of countries that supply troops. However, to the people of Côte d'Ivoire, the UN may not be perceived as biased due to its connection with its former colonizer, France, in the 2010 election crisis. The all-out support for the Northerners may been perceived as an infringement on Côte d'Ivoire’s sovereignty, which has become of increasing concern to West African nations. The perception of the UN may demand surveys to be conducted to truly understand where feelings lie today, but it is clear that French support is weaning. UN missions to Côte d'Ivoire, should not rely on a partnership with France (as they have historically) but with ECOWAS to reduce the UN’s expense (making deployment more viable) and limiting the UN’s connection with their former colonizer.
The UN’s effectiveness depends on its perception as an unbiased actor. The UN may have lost some of its reputation with the people of Côte d'Ivoire after the Second Ivorian Civil War due to its connection with the French. The UN should further partner with ECOWAS to respect concerns of the Global North’s infringement on Ivorian Sovereignty. If the UN is to deploy peacekeepers the ECOWAS partnership remains of vital importance as it increases field diversity while connection with West African troops reduces horizontal diversity. Higher field diversity results in fewer civilian casualties due to increased combat capabilities and reduced bias. Limiting horizontal distance is important in ensuring that the peacekeepers are aware of cultural norms and can communicate in the local languages.
Notes:
1 “United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire” United Nations, March 9, 2025, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minuci/
2 “Cote d’Ivoire Facesheet,” CIA World Factbook, updated February 19, 2025, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cote-divoire/; “The World Bank in Côte d’Ivoire,” World Bank Group, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/overview
3 “Félix Houphouët-Boigny,” Britannica Encyclope, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Felix-Houphouet-Boigny
4 “Cote d’Ivoire Facesheet”
5 Kathleen Bruhn, “Aurhoritarian Instituions,” November 6th, 2024, UCSB Political Science 6
6 Abu Bakarr Bah, “Seeking Democracy in Côte d’Ivoire: Overcoming Exclusionary Citizenship,” Global Centre for Pluralism, November 2017
7 Reuters, “Coup Failed In Ivory Coast, Officials Say,” New York Times, January 9, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/09/world/coup-failed-in-ivory-coast-officials-say.html
8 “General Background on the Military-Political Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire,” Human Rights Watch, May 2008, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/cdi0508/6.htm#_ftnref14
9 Samuel Momodu, “First Ivorian Civil War (2002-2007)” Black Past, August 5, 2018 https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/first-ivorian-civil-war-2002-2007/
10 “General Background”
11 Momodu “First Ivorian Civil War”
12 Samuel Momodu “Second Ivorian Civil War (2010-2011)” Black Past, December 22, 2018, https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/events-global-african-history/second-ivorian-civil-war-2010-2011/
13 Ruth Maclean “A Staunch Ally in Africa Says French Forces Will Withdraw” The New York Times, January 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/01/world/africa/ivory-coast-france-troop-withdrawal.html
14 “Resolution 1479” United Nations Security Council, May 12, 2003; “United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire”
15 “United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire” Facts and Figures
16 “Resolution 1528 (2004)” United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2004
17 Ibid. p. 2-5.
18 “Resolution 1933 (2010)” United Nations Secutity Council, June 30, 2010
19 “Res. 1528” p. 5
20 United Nations, “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards” United Nations, 2014, p. 24
21 United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants in Côte d’Ivoire” United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, https://onuci.unmissions.org/en/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ex-combatants-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire
22 Ibid.
23 “Res. 1933”
24 “United Nations bars 16 peacekeepers from Benin following Ivory Coast sex abuse claims” defenseWeb, September 6, 2011, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/united-nations-bars-16-peacekeepers-from-benin-following-ivory-coast-sex-abuse-claims/
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 UN News “Côte d’Ivoire: UN responding to allegations of sex abuse by peacekeepers” United Nations, September 1, 2011, https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/09/385452
28 Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley “Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-Conflict States” Oxford Studies in Gender and International Relations, 2017
29 “United Nations bars 16 peacekeepers from Benin following Ivory Coast sex abuse claims”
30 Michael W Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “Making War and Building Peace” Princeton University Press, 2011
31 William G. Nomikos “Local Peace, International Builders: How UN Peacekeeping Builds Peace from the Bottom Up” Cambrige Press, 2025
32 Mahmood Mamdani, “Ivory Coast: A UN failure” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/4/27/ivory-coast-a-un-failure
33 Maclean “French Forces Will Withdraw”
34 Vincenzo Bove, et. al. “Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping” Oxford University Press, 2020, DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790655.001.0001
